Letang v Cooper is a seminal English Court of Appeal decision that significantly clarified the distinction between the torts of trespass to the person and negligence in claims involving personal injury. Decided in 1964 and reported in 1965, the case firmly established that personal injury caused by negligent, as opposed to intentional, conduct cannot be pursued under trespass to the person.
Instead, such claims must be brought under the tort of negligence, which carries its own procedural and limitation requirements. This case has had a lasting impact on English tort law by narrowing the scope of trespass to the person and emphasising the necessity of intention for claims in trespass.
Facts of Letang v Cooper Case
The facts of Letang v Cooper are straightforward but legally significant. Mrs Letang, the claimant, was sunbathing on a patch of grass normally used as a car park. While she was lying there, Mr Cooper, the defendant, negligently reversed his Jaguar motor car over her legs, causing injury. Importantly, the defendant did not intend to cause harm; the injury was purely the result of negligent driving.
After the incident, Mrs Letang initially did not bring any legal action. When she eventually decided to sue, the limitation period for negligence claims—three years under the Limitation Act 1939 and subsequent amendments—had already expired. To circumvent this, she filed a claim in trespass to the person, a tort that traditionally allowed claims for personal injuries even where intention was not always clear.
Thus, the key factual backdrop to Letang v Cooper was a personal injury caused by careless but unintentional conduct, with the claimant seeking to recover damages by invoking trespass to the person rather than negligence due to the expiry of the limitation period.
Legal Issues
At the heart of Letang v Cooper was a fundamental legal question: can a claimant recover damages for personal injury caused by negligence by bringing an action in trespass to the person? More specifically, does trespass to the person encompass injuries arising from negligent, non-intentional conduct, or is it limited to intentional torts only?
Prior to this case, the law surrounding trespass to the person was somewhat blurred, with some authorities suggesting that trespass could be used for both intentional and negligent acts that caused direct interference with the claimant. The claimant in Letang v Cooper sought to rely on the broader interpretation, using trespass to avoid the limitation period for negligence.
The court was therefore asked to consider whether the law should distinguish between intentional and negligent acts in the context of trespass to the person, and what the correct cause of action was for injuries caused without intent.
Judgment and Reasoning in Letang v Cooper
The Court of Appeal delivered a unanimous judgment, with Lord Denning MR, Diplock LJ, and Danckwerts LJ presiding. Their decision firmly rejected the claimant’s attempt to pursue a trespass claim for a negligent injury. The court held that trespass to the person requires an intentional act causing harm and that personal injuries caused by negligence must be pursued under the tort of negligence.
In the judgment, the court reasoned that allowing negligent acts to be pursued as trespass would blur important distinctions in tort law and undermine statutory limitations designed to encourage timely claims. The statute of limitations applicable to negligence claims barred Mrs Letang’s action, and she could not escape this by recharacterising her claim as trespass.
Lord Denning notably summarised the historical position, explaining how under old law a direct and immediate application of force allowed trespass claims without alleging negligence, as in Leame v Bray (1803) and Reynolds v Clarke (1726). He explained that if an injury is immediate, trespass lies; if consequential, only an action on the case (now negligence) applies.
However, the court recognised that modern law requires a clearer separation: whether the injury is direct or consequential, if caused carelessly rather than intentionally, the claim is one of negligence. This modernisation meant that in cases like Letang v Cooper, where injury resulted from careless driving rather than deliberate conduct, trespass to the person is no longer a valid cause of action.
The decision thereby narrowed trespass to the person strictly to intentional torts such as assault, battery, and false imprisonment. Negligent injuries must be pursued via negligence claims, which are subject to their own elements and limitation periods.
Conclusion
In conclusion, Letang v Cooper decisively resolved a critical legal issue by holding that personal injury caused by negligent conduct cannot be recovered under trespass to the person. Instead, such claims must be brought under negligence, which is subject to limitation periods and specific elements to prove.
The case is a landmark in English law that narrowed the ambit of trespass to the person to intentional torts, reinforcing the separate identities and procedural requirements of negligence and trespass. It prevents claimants from circumventing limitation statutes by mischaracterising their cause of action and provides clarity for courts and litigants regarding the correct tort for personal injury claims.
Thus, Letang v Cooper remains a key precedent for the interplay between intention, negligence, and the appropriate legal remedies available for personal injuries in English tort law.
