R v Jogee [2016] UKSC 8 is a landmark decision of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom which significantly reshaped the law on joint enterprise and complicity. It overturned the long-standing principle derived from Chan Wing-Siu v The Queen [1985] AC 168, which had equated foresight with intent in determining the liability of secondary parties. The case was heard together with Ruddock v The Queen [2016] UKPC 7, an appeal from Jamaica, and both judgements were delivered jointly.
The Supreme Court held that the law had “taken a wrong turning” and made it clear that mere foresight of a crime is not sufficient for establishing guilt as an accessory. Instead, the prosecution must prove that the secondary party intended to encourage or assist the principal in committing the offence. This decision has had a major impact on the law of criminal complicity in England and Wales, reshaping the boundaries of accessorial liability.
Facts of R v Jogee
On the night of 9 June 2011, Ameen Jogee and his co-defendant, Hirsi, spent the evening consuming alcohol and drugs. Their behaviour became increasingly aggressive as the night went on. Twice during that evening, they visited the home of Naomi Reid, who was in a relationship with Paul Fyfe (the deceased).
After the second visit, Naomi Reid sent a message to Jogee asking him not to bring Hirsi back to her home. Despite this, Jogee and Hirsi returned for a third time shortly afterwards. By this time, Paul Fyfe had also returned to the house, and an angry confrontation broke out between him and the two men.
In the early hours of 10 June 2011, at around 2:30 am, the situation escalated. Jogee remained outside the house, vocally encouraging Hirsi. During the confrontation, Hirsi stabbed Fyfe, who died from his injuries. Jogee did not himself stab the deceased but was alleged to have played an active role in encouraging Hirsi to do so.
This factual background gave rise to the legal question of whether Jogee could be held liable for murder under the principle of joint enterprise, based solely on his foresight that Hirsi might commit the fatal act.
Crown Court Proceedings in R v Jogee
At trial in Nottingham Crown Court, presided over by Dobbs J, the judge directed the jury in line with the then-established law on joint enterprise. The direction stated that Jogee could be found guilty of murder if he had participated in the attack by encouraging Hirsi, and realised when doing so that Hirsi might use a knife with the intent to cause really serious harm.
On this basis, Jogee was convicted of murder. He was sentenced to life imprisonment with a minimum term of 20 years before being eligible for parole. This was later reduced to 18 years. The conviction and sentence reflected the application of the principle laid down in Chan Wing-Siu v The Queen, which treated foresight of the principal’s actions as sufficient to establish the mental element for secondary liability.
Court of Appeal in R v Jogee
Jogee appealed against his conviction to the Court of Appeal. The court, however, upheld the reasoning of the trial judge. Laws LJ stated that the mental element of a secondary party’s liability consisted in the appreciation that the principal might inflict grievous bodily harm, coupled with a willingness to lend support to the criminal venture.
The Court of Appeal approved the trial judge’s interpretation of the law and affirmed Jogee’s conviction. The only modification was a reduction of his minimum sentence from 20 years to 18 years. The Court of Appeal’s decision therefore continued to apply the principle that foresight was enough to establish the required intent for complicity.
Issues before the Supreme Court
R v Jogee case eventually reached the Supreme Court, which had to determine whether the principle of Parasitic Accessory Liability, as established in Chan Wing-Siu v The Queen, represented a correct statement of the law. The central issue was whether foresight of a crime by the accessory could be treated as equivalent to intent in establishing liability.
The appeal was significant because for three decades, English courts had applied the reasoning in Chan Wing-Siu, treating foresight of what the principal might do as sufficient to convict a secondary party. The Supreme Court in R v Jogee [2016] UKSC 8 was tasked with reconsidering this approach.
The Supreme Court’s Decision in R v Jogee
The Supreme Court, sitting together with the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in R v Jogee [2016] UKSC 8 and Ruddock v The Queen, unanimously held that the law had taken a wrong turning with Chan Wing-Siu.
Assistance and Encouragement
In a joint lead judgement delivered by Lords Hughes and Toulson, the court emphasised that secondary liability rests on two elements:
- Conduct – the accessory must have actually assisted or encouraged the commission of the crime; and
- Mental element – the accessory must have intended to so assist or encourage.
It was stressed that foresight is not the same as intent. At most, foresight is evidence from which a jury may infer intent, but it cannot itself be treated as conclusive proof of it.
Fault and Intention
The court clarified that if the crime requires a particular fault element (such as the principal intending to kill), then the secondary party must have intended to assist the principal in acting with that fault. Importantly, the accessory does not need to intend that the crime actually be committed; they might be indifferent to whether it occurs. What matters is the intention to provide assistance or encouragement to the principal, who commits the crime with the requisite mental state.
Conditional Intention
The court also recognised the concept of conditional intention. For example, in a robbery scenario where offenders carry weapons intending to use them only if met with resistance, a jury may properly infer that all the offenders intended that, if resistance occurred, the weapons would be used to cause grievous bodily harm.
Clarification of Examples
The judgement gave practical illustrations. If a defendant encourages another to borrow a bicycle with the intention that it will be returned, but the principal instead keeps it, the defendant would not be guilty of theft. The reason is that the defendant did not intend to encourage the principal to act with the mental element required for theft, namely, the intent to permanently deprive.
Outcome in R v Jogee
The Supreme Court in R v Jogee [2016] UKSC 8 concluded that the earlier approach in Chan Wing-Siu v The Queen was wrong in law. The equating of foresight with intent was disapproved. Consequently, Jogee’s murder conviction was quashed.
The court emphasised that for future cases, accessory liability must be established by showing both conduct and intention: proof that the defendant assisted or encouraged the crime, and proof that they intended to do so with knowledge of the principal’s mental element.
Conclusion
R v Jogee [2016] UKSC 8 stands as a landmark in the modern law of criminal complicity. It restored clarity to the principles governing secondary liability by requiring proof of intent, not merely foresight. By quashing Jogee’s conviction and disapproving Chan Wing-Siu, the Supreme Court realigned the law with fundamental criminal principles.
The case remains a key authority on joint enterprise, often studied by students and practitioners alike. Its implications continue to shape prosecutions involving multiple defendants where the question of accessorial liability arises. In bringing the law back onto its correct path, the decision in R v Jogee [2016] UKSC 8 reaffirmed the importance of intention as the cornerstone of criminal responsibility.