R v Pace and Rogers is an important decision of the Court of Appeal that clarifies how intention and knowledge operate in offences involving criminal property, particularly where the offence charged is an attempt. The case focuses on the correct interpretation of the mental element required under the Criminal Attempts Act 1981 when read together with the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002.
It is especially significant for understanding why suspicion alone is not enough to establish criminal liability for offences that demand specific intent.
Background and Facts of R v Pace and Rogers
In R v Pace and Rogers, the defendants, Martin Edward Pace and Simon Peter Rogers, operated a scrap metal yard. They were involved in purchasing scrap metal as part of their business. The prosecution alleged that the defendants had attempted to conceal, disguise, or convert criminal property.
The charge was brought under Section 1 of the Criminal Attempts Act 1981, with the substantive offence being linked to Section 327(1) of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002.
The prosecution’s case was based on transactions in which the defendants purchased items from undercover police officers. It was argued that the defendants suspected that the items they were buying were stolen. This suspicion, according to the prosecution, was enough to establish the mental element required for the offence of attempting to deal with criminal property.
However, a crucial factual point emerged during the trial. It was established that none of the items purchased by the defendants were actually stolen. Despite this, the trial judge dismissed the defendants’ submission of no case to answer.
The judge ruled that suspicion about the criminal nature of the property could be sufficient to establish the required mens rea. The jury was directed accordingly, and the defendants were convicted.
Legal Context of the Charges
The legal framework in R v Pace and Rogers involved the interaction between two statutes. Section 327(1) of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 creates offences relating to dealing with criminal property, including concealing, disguising, converting, transferring, or removing such property. A key element of this offence is that the property must be “criminal property”.
Section 1(1) of the Criminal Attempts Act 1981 provides that a person is guilty of an attempt to commit an offence if, with intent to commit that offence, they do an act which is more than merely preparatory. This means that for an attempt, the prosecution must prove an intention to commit the full substantive offence, including all of its essential elements.
The central question in the case was how these provisions should be read together, particularly in relation to the mental element required where the offence charged is an attempt involving criminal property.
Issues Before the Court
In R v Pace and Rogers, the Court of Appeal had to consider several closely connected issues. The first issue was whether Section 1 of the Criminal Attempts Act 1981 requires a defendant to intend all the elements of the substantive offence, including the criminal nature of the property involved.
The second issue was whether suspicion or doubt about the origin of property could satisfy the mental element for offences that require specific intent. The trial judge had taken the view that suspicion was sufficient, but this interpretation was challenged on appeal.
The third issue concerned whether the jury had been misdirected. The defendants argued that the judge’s directions had improperly lowered the threshold for conviction by allowing the jury to convict based on suspicion rather than proof of intent and knowledge.
R v Pace and Rogers Judgment of the Court of Appeal
The Court of Appeal allowed the appeals in R v Pace and Rogers and quashed the convictions. The court held that the trial judge’s approach to the mental element was incorrect. It emphasised that Section 1(1) of the Criminal Attempts Act 1981 requires an intention to complete all elements of the substantive offence.
Where the substantive offence is under Section 327(1) of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, one of those essential elements is that the property must be criminal property. For an attempt to commit this offence, the defendant must therefore intend that the property be criminal property. It is not enough that the defendant merely suspects or doubts that the property may be criminal.
The court made it clear that suspicion falls short of the level of mens rea required. The prosecution must prove that the defendant knew or believed that the property was criminal in nature. Because the trial judge had directed the jury that suspicion alone could suffice, the convictions were considered unsafe and were set aside.
Reasoning of the Court
In R v Pace and Rogers, the Court of Appeal relied on established principles relating to attempts and specific intent offences. An attempt offence requires a higher level of mental commitment than some completed offences. This is because the law is concerned with punishing conduct that is directed towards the commission of a crime with full intent, even if the crime is not completed.
The court explained that allowing suspicion to substitute for intention would dilute the statutory requirement under the Criminal Attempts Act 1981. It would also risk criminalising conduct that Parliament did not intend to punish, particularly in commercial contexts where suspicion may arise without firm knowledge or belief.
The court also stressed the importance of strict interpretation in criminal law. Where Parliament has required proof of intent and knowledge, courts must ensure that these elements are properly established. Jury directions that blur the distinction between suspicion and intent undermine this principle and create a risk of wrongful conviction.
Conclusion
In conclusion, R v Pace and Rogers stands as a clear statement of principle on the mental element required for attempt offences involving criminal property. The Court of Appeal confirmed that intention must extend to every element of the substantive offence, including the criminal nature of the property.
Suspicion or doubt, without knowledge or belief, is not enough. By quashing the convictions, the court reinforced strict statutory interpretation and upheld fundamental protections relating to proof of mens rea in criminal law.