R v Jones & Smith [1976] 1 WLR 672

R v Jones & Smith is an important English criminal law decision concerning burglary under section 9(1)(b) of the Theft Act 1968. The case clarified that a person with general permission to enter premises may still become a trespasser if they knowingly or recklessly exceed the scope of that permission. The judgment remains a significant authority on the meaning of trespass in burglary offences.

Facts of R v Jones & Smith

On 10 May 1975, John Jones and Christopher Smith were arrested during the early hours of the morning after attracting the attention of police officers. The defendants were travelling in a car driven by Smith, and officers noticed a television set protruding from the back of the vehicle. This unusual sight led the police to stop and investigate the matter further.

At approximately the same time, Smith’s father reported that two television sets were missing from his house. He initially suspected that burglars may have entered the premises through a window that had already been broken. The police later discovered that both missing television sets were inside the car occupied by the defendants.

The evidence presented during the proceedings revealed inconsistencies in the accounts provided by Jones and Smith. According to the All England Law Reports version of the judgment, the defendants contradicted one another during police interviews and later contradicted themselves while giving evidence at trial. These contradictions became relevant in assessing the credibility of their explanations regarding possession of the television sets.

A particularly important aspect of the case involved the evidence of Smith’s father. During the trial, the Crown treated him as a hostile witness because he supported Smith’s claim that the television sets had been removed merely for safekeeping. Smith’s father also stated that Christopher Smith “would not be a trespasser in the house at any time”.

Both defendants were convicted of burglary on 22 September 1975 and sentenced to twelve months’ imprisonment. They appealed against their convictions on four grounds. The principal argument raised on appeal was that Smith had general permission from his father to enter the premises whenever he wished. Consequently, the defendants argued that Smith could not legally be regarded as a trespasser.

Issues Raised

The central issue before the court in R v Jones & Smith was whether a person who has general permission to enter a building can still become a trespasser for the purposes of burglary under section 9(1)(b) of the Theft Act 1968.

The court also considered whether entry into premises with the intention of stealing property amounted to acting beyond the permission granted by the owner. The judges had to determine whether permission to enter a property could be limited by the purpose for which the entry was made.

Another issue concerned the mental element required for trespass in burglary offences. The court examined whether knowledge that one was acting beyond permission, or recklessness regarding that possibility, would be sufficient to establish trespass.

The case further raised broader questions about the relationship between civil concepts of trespass and criminal law. Trespass had traditionally been associated with tort law and had not formed part of burglary offences under the earlier Larceny Act 1916. The judges therefore had to interpret how trespass should operate within the framework of the Theft Act 1968.

Arguments

The defendants argued that Smith had unrestricted permission from his father to enter the family home whenever he wished. Because of this standing permission, they contended that he could not legally be classified as a trespasser. The defence maintained that the existence of permission to enter the premises was enough to defeat the burglary charge.

The defendants also argued that the purpose or intention behind the entry should not affect the legality of the entry itself. In their view, if permission existed generally, entry into the property remained lawful regardless of subsequent actions inside the house.

The prosecution argued that permission to enter premises is not unlimited in every circumstance. The Crown submitted that a person may exceed the scope of permission depending upon the purpose and nature of the entry. It was argued that entering a property with the intention to steal was outside the permission granted by Smith’s father.

The prosecution further argued that the defendants knew they were acting beyond any authority given to them and therefore entered the premises as trespassers within the meaning of section 9(1)(b) of the Theft Act 1968.

R v Jones & Smith Judgment

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals and upheld the convictions for burglary. Lord Justice James delivered the judgment and observed that the concept of trespass in burglary law was relatively new within criminal law. Since trespass had not been an element under the Larceny Act 1916, existing criminal authorities provided limited assistance.

The court relied significantly upon R v Collins, which had previously considered the issue of trespass in burglary offences. Reference was also made to the civil case of Hillen and Pettigrew v ICI (Alkali) Ltd. The judges repeated the well-known statement:

“When you invite a person into your house to use the staircase you do not invite him to slide down the banisters.”

Using this principle, the court held that a person becomes a trespasser for the purposes of section 9(1)(b) if he enters premises knowing that he is acting beyond the permission granted to him, or if he is reckless as to whether he exceeds that permission.

The judges concluded that the defendants had entered the premises while knowingly exceeding the scope of any permission granted by Smith’s father. Their appeals were therefore dismissed.

Reasoning by the Court in R v Jones & Smith

The reasoning in R v Jones & Smith focused on the idea that permission to enter property may be limited by purpose and circumstance. The court accepted that a person may generally have authority to enter premises but may still become a trespasser if the entry occurs for an unauthorised reason.

The judges emphasised the mental state of the accused. Knowledge that one is acting beyond the permission granted, or recklessness regarding that possibility, was considered sufficient to establish trespass. The court stated that if facts known to the accused enable him to realise that he is acting beyond permission, then the jury may properly conclude that he entered as a trespasser.

The court also approved the recorder’s comments at trial that entry with intent to steal was burglarious because no one grants permission to another person to commit theft within their property. However, the judges recognised that treating every dishonest entry as trespass could potentially make all shoplifting incidents amount to burglary. The judgment explained that this concern was limited because proof of the required intent at the time of entry remained necessary.

The decision demonstrated the court’s attempt to balance the wording of the Theft Act 1968 with practical criminal law principles. The judges avoided interpreting permission so broadly that burglary offences would become ineffective where individuals abused existing access to property for dishonest purposes.

R v Jones & Smith Case Summary

R v Jones & Smith established that a person with general permission to enter premises may nevertheless become a trespasser if they knowingly or recklessly exceed the scope of that permission. The case clarified the meaning of trespass for burglary offences under section 9(1)(b) of the Theft Act 1968.

Jones and Smith entered the house belonging to Smith’s father and removed two television sets. Although Smith usually had permission to enter the property, the Court of Appeal held that this permission did not extend to entry for the purpose of theft.

The court ruled that knowledge or recklessness regarding the excess of permission is sufficient to establish trespass. The convictions for burglary were therefore upheld. The case remains an important authority in English criminal law because it clarified how trespass operates within burglary offences and explained that permission to enter property may be restricted by the purpose for which entry occurs.