Court: Court of Appeal
Date: 1951
Judge(s): Lord Denning, LJ
Area of Law: Contract Law, Promissory Estoppel, Consideration
Facts of Combe v Combe
Combe v Combe is a significant case in English contract law concerning the doctrine of promissory estoppel and the necessity of consideration in the formation of a valid contract. The facts of the case revolve around a divorce settlement between Mr. and Mrs. Combe. The couple had been married, and during their marriage, Mr. Combe promised to pay Mrs. Combe a sum of £100 annually as maintenance after their divorce.
When the couple divorced, Mr. Combe failed to pay the maintenance he had promised. Despite this, Mrs. Combe did not immediately seek legal action for the unpaid amount. Instead, she refrained from taking any legal steps, partly because of Mr. Combe’s apparent financial difficulties. After a period of seven years, Mrs. Combe sought to enforce the maintenance payment. She argued that the promise made by Mr. Combe to pay the annual sum was legally binding under the principle of promissory estoppel. Mrs. Combe contended that she had relied on his promise to her detriment, as she had not taken legal action for the arrears.
At first instance, the court agreed with Mrs. Combe, concluding that the promise could be enforced under promissory estoppel, even in the absence of consideration. This decision was appealed by Mr. Combe, and the case was subsequently heard in the Court of Appeal.
Legal Issue
The primary issue before the Court of Appeal in Combe v Combe was whether the principle of promissory estoppel could be invoked to enforce a promise that lacked consideration. Additionally, the court needed to decide whether the wife could enforce her husband’s promise despite having failed to act upon it for several years. In essence, the case raised the question of whether promissory estoppel could create a cause of action where none existed, particularly when the necessary legal requirement of consideration was absent.
This case came shortly after the landmark decision in Central London Property Trust Ltd v High Trees House Ltd ([1947] KB 130), a case in which promissory estoppel had been recognised as a defence. The Court in High Trees held that a party could not renege on a promise made where the other party had relied upon it to their detriment. The decision in Combe v Combe sought to clarify whether promissory estoppel could be used in a similar manner, not just as a defensive shield, but as a means to create a legal cause of action, even where there was no underlying contract supported by consideration.
Combe v Combe Judgement
The Court of Appeal, led by Lord Denning, reversed the decision of the lower court, siding with Mr. Combe. Denning LJ provided a thorough analysis of the principles involved and elaborated on the applicability of promissory estoppel in this context.
Denning’s View on Promissory Estoppel
Lord Denning’s judgement is particularly significant for its development of the law surrounding promissory estoppel. Denning LJ affirmed the principle from the High Trees case, which had allowed promissory estoppel to act as a defence to prevent a party from departing from an established understanding. However, he clarified that this principle could only be used as a “shield”, not as a “sword”. In other words, promissory estoppel could prevent one party from going back on their promise after the other party had relied on it, but it could not create a cause of action where none existed.
Denning LJ explained that, for promissory estoppel to be invoked, there must be an existing legal relationship or a claim based on that relationship. In High Trees, there was an underlying cause of action – the original agreement to pay rent – and the court found that the promise to reduce rent could not be withdrawn once the tenants had relied on it. However, in Combe v Combe, there was no underlying contractual agreement to pay maintenance that was supported by consideration. The absence of consideration meant that there was no valid contract between Mr. and Mrs. Combe upon which the principle of promissory estoppel could operate.
The Doctrine of Consideration
Lord Denning also emphasised the continued importance of the doctrine of consideration in English contract law. He made it clear that consideration is still a cardinal necessity for the formation of a contract. In the context of Combe v Combe, the wife’s forbearance from suing for maintenance was not sufficient consideration because it was not done at the request of the husband. Denning LJ noted that forbearance from a legal right, such as the right to sue for maintenance, would only count as consideration if it were done at the other party’s request.
Furthermore, Denning LJ pointed out that even if the wife had promised not to sue for maintenance, this would still not amount to valid consideration. This is because the statutory right to apply for maintenance could not be waived by private agreement, a point that highlights the limitation of promissory estoppel in cases involving statutory rights. Denning LJ remarked that promissory estoppel could not override or eliminate the need for consideration in a contract.
Conclusion
Combe v Combe [1951] 2 KB 215 is an important case that provides valuable clarification on the use of promissory estoppel and the essential doctrine of consideration in contract law. The case reinforces the principle that, while promissory estoppel can prevent a party from backtracking on a promise once the other party has relied on it, it cannot create an enforceable contract in the absence of consideration. Lord Denning’s judgement established a clear boundary for the application of promissory estoppel, ensuring that it cannot be used as a tool to bypass the fundamental requirements of contract law. This case remains a critical decision for understanding the limits of promissory estoppel and its relationship with the doctrine of consideration.
