The case of Director of Public Prosecutions v Morgan [1976] AC 182 is a landmark decision in UK criminal law concerning the issue of consent in rape cases. It has been one of the most controversial rulings in rape law and has significantly influenced the legal approach towards the defence of honest belief in consent.
This case raised important questions about mens rea (mental state) and whether a defendant’s belief in consent, even if unreasonable, could exonerate them from criminal liability for rape.
The House of Lords’ decision in this case remains highly debated, particularly in its interpretation of what constitutes a genuine belief in consent and its implications on the protection of victims of sexual violence. This case brief will examine the facts, issues, legal principles, and the impact of DPP v Morgan, as well as its place in the evolution of rape law.
Facts of DPP v Morgan
The facts of DPP v Morgan involve a series of events where William Morgan, a Royal Air Force officer, invited three of his friends to his home on the evening of 15 August 1973. Morgan told his friends that his wife, Daphne, was “kinky” and that she would feign resistance during sexual intercourse but actually enjoyed it. He explicitly told them that any signs of protest or struggle were not to be seen as a lack of consent.
Later that night, the three men entered the home, where they found Daphne asleep with her young son in bed. Despite her protests, they dragged her out of bed, held her down, and raped her while the others restrained her. Daphne screamed for help, but she was gagged and choked into submission. After the assault, Morgan himself also engaged in sexual intercourse with his wife, under the belief that she consented to the act, as he had previously instructed his friends.
The following day, Daphne reported the assault to the police and was taken to the hospital, where she received medical attention. Morgan, along with the three other men, was charged with rape. Morgan was convicted of aiding and abetting the rape, while his friends were convicted of rape. They all appealed the conviction on the grounds of their honest belief that the complainant consented to the sexual acts.
Issues
The central issue in DPP v Morgan was whether a defendant could be acquitted of rape if they honestly believed, albeit unreasonably, that the complainant had consented to the sexual act. More specifically, the case raised the question of whether the defendant’s belief in consent had to be reasonable, or if an honest belief, regardless of reasonableness, would suffice to provide a defence.
The defendants argued that they should not be convicted of rape because they had an honest belief in Daphne’s consent. They contended that as long as their belief was genuine, the lack of reasonable grounds for that belief was irrelevant. The trial judge had instructed the jury that for a conviction of rape to occur, it had to be proved that the complainant did not consent to the sexual act. He also stated that the defendants’ belief in consent could exonerate them, but it must be based on reasonable grounds.
The defence appealed against the trial judge’s direction, and the matter was brought before the House of Lords.
DPP v Morgan Judgement
The House of Lords, in a majority decision, held that the defence of honest belief in consent was valid, even if the belief was unreasonable. The judgement emphasised that the critical factor in determining guilt for rape was whether the defendant held an honest and genuine belief in the complainant’s consent, rather than whether that belief was based on reasonable grounds.
Lord Wilberforce, delivering the leading judgement, stated that the law did not require a reasonable belief in consent but only that the defendant’s belief was honestly held. The House of Lords made it clear that rape required the prosecution to prove that the defendant had the intention to commit the act and that there was a lack of consent. It was also necessary for the defendant to have knowledge that the complainant had not consented or be reckless as to whether she consented.
The ruling created a legal precedent whereby the mens rea (mental state) for rape was found to be focused on the defendant’s honest belief in consent. In this case, the court determined that as long as the belief was genuine, it did not need to be reasonable. This decision marked a significant shift in how courts approached the issue of consent in rape cases.
Despite the ruling in favour of the defendants’ appeal, the convictions were upheld. The court applied the “proviso” under the Criminal Appeal Act 1968, which allows convictions to be upheld even if a legal error was made in the trial, as long as it was considered that no reasonable jury would have acquitted the defendants.
Conclusion
DPP v Morgan [1976] AC 182 remains one of the most important and controversial cases in the development of rape law in the United Kingdom. The case established that an honest belief in consent could provide a complete defence to rape, regardless of whether that belief was reasonable. While the decision sought to clarify the mens rea for rape, it was widely criticised for potentially allowing defendants to avoid conviction through a defence that could be misused.
Despite this, the case has had a lasting impact on the development of sexual offence law, and its legacy was addressed in later reforms, particularly with the introduction of the Sexual Offences Act 2003. DPP v Morgan continues to be a key case in understanding the balance between protecting the rights of the accused and safeguarding the rights of victims in rape cases.
