Michael v Chief Constable of South Wales Police is a landmark case in UK tort law that addresses the scope of police liability in negligence claims, particularly concerning omissions and the duty of care owed by police to individuals threatened with harm by third parties. The case arose from tragic facts where the failure of police to respond promptly to a distress call allegedly led to the brutal death of Ms Michael. The Supreme Court’s decision provides crucial clarifications on the application of ordinary negligence principles to public authorities and explores the limits of private law duties owed by the police to members of the public.
Facts of Michael v Chief Constable of South Wales Police
On 5 August 2009, at approximately 2:29 am, Ms Michael made a 999 call seeking police protection from her ex-partner, who had been physically violent and threatening. During the call, Ms Michael reported that her ex-boyfriend had assaulted her current partner, biting his ear and forcibly taking him away in a car. Importantly, Ms Michael stated that the ex-partner had threatened to “fucking kill you” during the call. However, the call handler claimed to have heard the threat as “hit you,” thereby underestimating the seriousness of the situation.
Ms Michael resided within the jurisdiction of South Wales Police, but the call was routed through a telephone mast located in Gwent, resulting in the call being directed to the Gwent Police call centre. Gwent Police graded the call as a G1 emergency, requiring an immediate police response. However, when the call handler relayed the information to South Wales Police, they provided only an abbreviated summary of the events and did not include the threat to kill. Consequently, South Wales Police downgraded the call’s urgency to G2, which required a response within 60 minutes.
Shortly after 2:43 am, Ms Michael made a second call during which she screamed, and the line then went dead. Police arrived at Ms Michael’s home at 2:51 am to find she had been brutally attacked and had died as a result of her injuries.
Following this, Ms Michael’s family initiated legal proceedings against both Gwent and South Wales Police, alleging negligence and breach of Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) under the Human Rights Act 1998, claiming that the police owed Ms Michael a duty to protect her life and failed in that duty.
Legal Issues
The principal legal issue in Michael v Chief Constable of South Wales Police was whether the police owed Ms Michael a duty of care in negligence for failing to respond promptly to her calls for help, and whether such a duty could be established given the general principles governing omissions in English law.
Two secondary but related issues were considered:
- Whether the “Interveners’ Liability Principle” applied—i.e., if police are aware or ought to be aware of a threat to the life or safety of an identifiable person, do they owe a private law duty of care in negligence to that person?
- Whether Lord Bingham’s Liability Principle applied, which suggests that when the police receive credible evidence of an imminent threat from a third party whose identity and location are known, a duty to take reasonable steps arises.
Michael v Chief Constable of South Wales Police Judgement
The Supreme Court, by a majority of 5 to 2, dismissed the negligence claim, ruling that the police did not owe Ms Michael a private law duty of care. The Court upheld the principle that the police’s duty to preserve peace is owed to the public at large and does not extend to a special relationship sufficient to give rise to a private law duty of care.
Reasoning in Michael v Chief Constable of South Wales Police
Application of Negligence Principles to Public Authorities
Lord Toulson, delivering the leading judgement, emphasised that ordinary principles of negligence apply to public authorities, including the police. However, the general rule is that there is no liability for pure omissions—that is, a failure to act—unless certain narrow exceptions exist. These exceptions include situations where the defendant:
- Has created the danger,
- Has control over the third party causing harm, or
- Has assumed responsibility towards the claimant.
None of these exceptions applied in this case.
The Court considered the “Interveners’ Liability Principle” and rejected it on the basis that imposing a duty of care only to identifiable victims would be unworkable and unjust. The Court gave the example of a situation where the police fail to prevent a criminal from shooting both an intended victim and a bystander. It would be inconsistent to compensate one but not the other based solely on their identifiable status.
Further, the Court reasoned that imposing such a duty would divert police resources and priorities due to the fear of litigation, which would be contrary to the public interest. The financial burden on police forces and, by extension, the public purse, was also a relevant consideration.
Regarding the Lord Bingham’s Liability Principle, the Court found it unsatisfactory to draw rigid lines based on the credibility or imminence of the threat or the identity of the informant. Such determinations were better suited to Parliament’s legislative role rather than judicial intervention.
Assumption of Responsibility
The Court also found there was no assumption of responsibility by the police towards Ms Michael. The only assurance given by the call handler was that the call would be passed on to South Wales Police; there was no promise regarding the urgency or timing of the police response. This distinguished the case from others, such as Kent v Griffiths, where ambulance services were held to have assumed responsibility by promising timely arrival.
Public Policy Considerations
Lord Toulson acknowledged that modifying the law to impose a duty of care could potentially improve police response and reduce domestic violence. However, the risk of police diverting resources to avoid litigation was a significant concern. The only certainty would be increased litigation and compensation costs, thereby straining police budgets.
Dissenting Opinion in Michael v Chief Constable of South Wales Police
Lord Kerr and Lady Hale dissented. Lord Kerr argued that the omissions rule should not apply to public authorities like the police, given their unique role in protecting life and safety. He considered that sufficient proximity existed between the police and Ms Michael because the police knew or ought to have known of the imminent threat to her life and had the means to prevent it.
Lord Kerr made a clear distinction between damage to property and damage to life, stressing that the law should accord greater protection to life and physical well-being.
Lady Hale concurred, highlighting that policy concerns were diminished in light of existing human rights protections under the Human Rights Act 1998 and the positive duties already imposed on police in public law.
Conclusion
In Michael v Chief Constable of South Wales Police, the Supreme Court upheld the principle that police liability in negligence is limited by the nature of their public duties and by established common law rules on omissions.
The police do not owe a private law duty of care to individuals threatened by third parties unless exceptional circumstances are met. The Court balanced the interests of individual claimants with the operational realities of policing and public policy concerns, concluding that it is for Parliament to decide if a compensatory scheme for police failures should be introduced.
This case remains a cornerstone in UK tort law on public authority liability and sets a high threshold for establishing police negligence in duty of care claims.
